HYLOMORPHIC DEFINITION IN ARISTOTLE: THE DILEMMA OF THE INCLUSION OF MATTER IN METAPHYSICS Z AND DE ANIMA I-II

• Grant number: 24/10300-6
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: October 01, 2024
• End date: September 30, 2025
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Breno Andrade Zuppolini
• Grantee: Leonardo Ricardo de Oliveira
• Host Institution: Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (EFLCH). Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). Campus Guarulhos. Guarulhos , SP, Brazil

Abstract

In Aristotle's Metaphysics Z, chapters 10 and 11, there is an apparent inconsistency regarding which parts of a given thing must be mentioned in its definition. Whereas some passages suggest that only the formal parts should be included, a passage that alludes to Socrates the Young (1036b 21-31) not only seems to suggest that the material parts must be mentioned, but also indicates that it would be a mistake not to include them in an adequate definition. In support of this proposition, Aristotle seems to suggest in the De Anima that appropriate definitions of anger and house refer to both the formal and the material aspects of these items. Given this dilemma, we believe Aristotle's position on this topic needs to be further investigated. Additionally, we intend to scrutinize different interpretations offered in the secondary literature, confront each of them with the textual evidence and entertain our own hypotheses about the relevant passages.