Self-Consciousness in Elizabeth Anscombe: an analysis of The First Person

• Grant number: 24/19178-9
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: February 01, 2025
• End date: January 31, 2026
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Anderson Luis Nakano
• Grantee: Carolina Bodanzky Bolognesi
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Comunicação, Letras e Artes. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

In her 1975 article The First Person (FP), Elizabeth Anscombe discusses the logical function of the word "I" and argues that it does not have a referential function. Some critics, however, regarded her thesis as paradoxical. According to Vincent Descombes, in his essay Le Marteau, Le Maillet et Le Clou, this accusation stems from a misinterpretation of the text, in which critics reduce the discussion to the question "Is the word 'I' a referential expression?". While we agree with Descombes's analysis and our research builds upon his conclusions, his reading of FP remains focused on the logical function of the word "I". Our research hypothesis suggests an alternative interpretation of Anscombe's text, proposing that the linguistic discussion regarding the logical function of "I" is, in fact, a means to address what we consider to be the central issue of the article, namely the discussion of self-consciousness. Our research aims to investigate the plausibility of this interpretative hypothesis.