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| Author(s): |
Beatriz Sorrentino Marques
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2015-12-07 |
| Examining board members: |
Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior;
Karla de Almeida Chediak;
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho;
André Leclerc;
Edelcio Gonçalves de Souza
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| Advisor: | Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior |
| Abstract | |
The problem of the Disappearing Agent is an objection that has haunted the Causal Theory of Action for most of its contemporary history, even if this theory has become the orthodoxy of action explanation. The objection questions what role, if any, is reserved for the agent, if only her mental states seem to have a relevant causal role in the production of action, as the Causal Theory of Action would have it. This question remains unsatisfactorily answered, and has even originated recent versions of the Disappearing Agent issue, which take Free Will and consciousness as being at the center of the debate. Therefore, acceptance of the Causal Theory of Action requires dealing with such problem. This debate will benefit from a dialog with psychology and neuroscience, and based on this exchange I will argue that the issue of the Disappearing Agent springs from a misguided conception of what is a human agent and what is the agents role in the production of her action. This becomes clear when we realize that this conception does not correspond to our current scientific knowledge about the production of human action. Accepting this, I then propose a different conception of agents that does not allow for the Disappearing Agent problem to rise. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 11/21030-0 - The faded agent: the agents role in action explanations and how practical reasoning may help in its understanding |
| Grantee: | Beatriz Sorrentino Marques |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |