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| Author(s): |
Marcos Daniel Camolezi
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2017-04-20 |
| Examining board members: |
Franklin Leopoldo e Silva;
Christian Bonnet;
Jean françois Braunstein;
Vincent Philippe Guillin;
Izilda Cristina Johanson;
Alex de Campos Moura
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| Advisor: | Franklin Leopoldo e Silva |
| Abstract | |
This thesis aims to understand the formation and the role of the causality concept in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), notably in the period from 1889 to 1907. Its first part is devoted to exposing the redefinition of causality concept within Time and Consciousness (1889). In this book, a set of statements were assumed by the philosopher so that causality in general becomes a sort of psychological causality, particularly in order to question the importance of the concept of causality itself in determining the inner experience of time. It is our intent to underscore how this change is operated on a cautious philosophical basis. In the second part of this work, we try to disclose how Bergson abandons the path of knowledge theory on behalf of an ontology based on incautious physiological bases, notably regarding the idea of body, which the author presents in Matter and memory (1896). From a philosophical point of view, his conception of subjectivity, defined within a field of possibilities, leaves open the way in which this field is backwards transformed from possibility to reality. Put differently, the philosopher reassures with philosophical accuracy the specificity of metaphysical action, but does not advance the problem of its achievement with a comparable degree of precision. Indeed, in some circumstances in the interim of Matter and Memory (1896) and The Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson dedicates to the problem of realization in explicit reference to the very problem of causality. It is from the conceptual unfoldings of that causality conceived as the feeling of effort that we are concerned here. Finally, the third part of the thesis presents an overall reflection on the points of view mentioned above. In it, the relevance of the two causalities is highlighted by the analysis of an unpublished course by Georges Canguilhem, in which the problem of causality in Bergson\'s philosophy is valued according to the way in which we try to understand and reveal it here. Thus, the discussion on the difficulties of material action may represent a prelude to the comprehension of the specificity of the problem of technical invention. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 13/22169-7 - Causality and its metaphysical counterparties in bergsonism: a complex epistemology of becoming |
| Grantee: | Marcos Daniel Camolezi |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate (Direct) |