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| Author(s): |
Luiz Augusto Rosa
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Marília. 2018-03-19. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp). Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências. Marília |
| Defense date: | 2018-02-02 |
| Advisor: | Jonas Gonçalves Coelho |
| Abstract | |
In this dissertation we sought to make a philosophical analysis of Antonio Damásio’s theories on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness in the face of the contemporary neurobiological context. In the first chapter, we reviewed the literature on the two paradigms of consciousness in neurobiology, in this case, the cognitive paradigm, where we reviewed the works of Crick, Baars, Dehaene, Tononi, Koch and LeDoux, and the affectivist paradigm, where we reviewed Panksepp’s core ideas. In the second chapter we review Damasio’s central ideas on emotion, feeling, self, and consciousness, analyzing both the conceptual and neurobiological actualization in the course of his major works, and how each theory is based on James’ ideas on emotional processes and the paradigms discussed in the first chapter. In the third chapter, we reviewed the core ideas of Russell’s and Barrett’s constructivist model of emotions, the stance of Damasio and other authors on the problematic about the possibility of consciousness in nonhuman animals, we assessed Damasio’s central theories in the face of the current neurobiological context, and we analyzed both the conceptual problems inherent in Damasio’s theory of consciousness and Damasio’s stance on the problem of mental causation and mind-brain identity. We hope, with this dissertation, to have contributed, even modestly, to a debate that has been gaining great impact in the specialized literature, which goes far beyond what was presented here. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 15/14849-3 - The consciousness according to Damasio: a neurophilosophical approach |
| Grantee: | Luiz Augusto Rosa |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |