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| Author(s): |
Hugo Neri Munhoz
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2017-12-13 |
| Examining board members: |
Mauricio de Carvalho Ramos;
Fabio Gagliardi Cozman;
Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior;
Carlos Eduardo Sell
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| Advisor: | Mauricio de Carvalho Ramos |
| Abstract | |
I discuss here the common sense, which is invariably a social dimension of knowledge, conceived in the form of beliefs, knowledge, judgments and values that are equally shared by a set of people. Hence, conceptions about common sense are explicitly present in different disciplines, such as the Human Sciences and Artificial Intelligence, and implicitly in some fundamental concepts such as intelligence. My goal here is to represent common sense. For that, I question the differences existing in the understanding between people involved in situations of common understanding. Therefore, I argue that abstract and systematic conceptions of common sense cannot explain how there can be \"differences in the common understanding\" or \"common understanding in the midst of existing differences\" in a given situation. Alternatively, I argue that common sense happens locally, in a not taken-for-grated and unsystematic way. Since at the beginning interactions words and concepts are both ambiguous, polysemic, lacunose, etc. there is a need to establish common references so that common understanding can be possible and more lasting social relations can be maintained: a) relations have restrictions on the number of closer ones according to the social brain hypothesis, and b) references are based on the relation of analogies of other experiences as a way to understand new situations. Relationships can be represented in the form of social networks, while references can be represented by semantic networks in which repertory familiarity can be treated as the growth of a person\'s total network of references. I argue that it is possible to conceive the parallelism between a person\'s social network and its general semantic network, and this parallelism can be represented. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 15/04051-4 - Social Cognition and the Problem of Knowledge |
| Grantee: | Hugo Neri Munhoz |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |