Full text
| |
| Author(s): |
Pedro Bravo de Souza
Total Authors: 1
|
| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Marília. 2018-09-26. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp). Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências. Marília |
| Defense date: | 2018-09-18 |
| Advisor: | Marcos Antonio Alves |
| Abstract | |
We aim to evaluate the reasonability of Colin Howson’s bayesian approach to the problem of induction, as elaborated by David Hume. We propose that an approach to the problem of induction will be reasonable if our induction understanding does not regress in relation to that provided by Hume. In turn, bayesianism is a theoretical position derived from the adoption of gradualism, probabilism and conditionalization theses; its merit is to provide a model for representing and updating degrees of belief. The problem of induction is the search to rationally justify inductive arguments, due to the humean thesis according to which it is impossible to do so, neither through demonstrative arguments, nor through probable arguments. To achieve our goal, this Dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, we expose the problem of induction and how Howson interprets it. In the second chapter, we discuss solutions to the problem of induction analyzed by him. In the third chapter, we introduce probability and bayesianism concepts and theses. In the fourth chapter, we present, first, Howson’s specific theses regarding the problem of induction; second, we criticize his interpretation of Hume, his objections to other approaches, and his own proposal; finally, we examine whether it is reasonable or not. We finish this master’s degree dissertation summarizing ours considerations. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/03251-2 - Bayesianism and the problem of induction: a critical investigation on Colin Howson's approach |
| Grantee: | Pedro Bravo de Souza |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |