Aquinas' definition of truth: a study about De veritate, 1, 1 and Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1

Author(s)

Matheus Barreto Pazos de Oliveira

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: Campinas, SP.
• Institution: Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
• Defense date: 2017-10-05

Examining board members

Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio; Lucas Angioni; Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora; Rodrigo Guerizoli; Marco Aurélio Oliveira da Silva

• Advisor: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the definition of truth according to Thomas Aquinas. In order to do that, we shall scrutinize that definition in two of his texts, namely De Veritate 1, 1 and Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1. In those texts Aquinas states that truth is the adequacy of the thing and the intellect. In examining this definition of truth, we intend to make explicit the presuppositions on which is based the choice of this definition by Aquinas. In De Veritate, 1, 1, the definition of truth is included in the presentation of the general notions of being. Such presentation, however, is not found in the discussion of the theme in Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1. Nevertheless, the definition of truth as the adequacy of the thing and the intellect is maintained in both texts. Our scrutiny of these texts aims at bringing to view the way Aquinas limits the definition of truth in the context of the exposition of general notions concerning the being in De Veritate 1, 1. We are also interested to know, Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1, Aquinas decides to maintain the definition of truth as the adequacy of the thing and the intellect, despite not making use of the same presuppositions as before (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 13/04718-3 - Aquinas' definition of truth: a study about De Veritate, 1, 1 and Summa Theologiae, I, 16, 1
• Grantee: Matheus Barreto Pazos de Oliveira
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate