Full text
| |
| Author(s): |
Johnatas Ximenes Milani
Total Authors: 1
|
| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Campinas, SP. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas |
| Defense date: | 2019-10-21 |
| Examining board members: |
Yara Adario Frateschi;
Maria Isabel de Magalhães Papaterra Limongi;
Felipe Gonçalves Silva
|
| Advisor: | Yara Adario Frateschi |
| Abstract | |
This dissertation aims to present, in opposition to the contemporary interpretations of Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib, an interpretation of the political-moral model proposed by Rousseau in the Social Contract that, instead of solving the tension between individual and community, brings it to the former plan. Hannah Arendt, in On Revolution, upon returning to the Social Contract through the historical experiences of the French Revolution, interprets the general will as a totalizing revolutionary power, opposed to the establishment of individual rights and, therefore, contrary to the exercise of freedom and the very realization of politics. Benhabib, in turn, in Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, states that when Rousseau removes from citizens the possibility of public deliberation and assigns to the Legislator the function of drafting the laws and submitting them for the community approval, he consequently advocates in favor of a united community of beliefs and customs, unable to incorporate the fact of plurality. Unlike Arendt or Benhabib, who eliminate the tension between community and individual by subjecting the latter unrestrictedly to the former, whether due to the absence of rights or the unity of customs, the reading presented here does not seek to nullify this insoluble and permanent tension, which inevitably manifests itself in every body politic. We will argue, on the one hand, that while it is necessary to establish an absolutely sovereign authority charged with giving unity and movement to the body politic, the existence of an absolute sovereign power does not necessarily imply, as Arendt believes, the existence of an arbitrary power. On the contrary, we will try to show that the establishment of an absolutely sovereign authority is a necessary condition for the possible establishment of civil rights committed to the preservation in society, and for all citizens, of the fundamental human goods prescribed by natural law. On the other hand, we will show that the effective realization of this, which would be the ultimate purpose of the institution of the body politic, depends on the permanent satisfaction of two essential conditions. Firstly, there must be institutions within the state that are favorable and responsible for both enhancing the appreciation of the common good and weakening the inclination to particular interest. Secondly, it is necessary for the State to be composed of citizens capable of acting in accordance with a morality that permits them, both to rationally abstract from their particular interests for the definition of the common interest, and to relate affectionately and as equals with the other members of the community. Contrary to what Benhabib thinks, this morality would be compatible with a certain plurality of ways of life because it would be, at the same time, constituted by principles restricted in quantity and broad in possibilities of realization. In short, in this dissertation, our purpose is to suggest that in the Social Contract the tension between individual and community not only finds no resolution, but also that its adequate understanding can only be properly achieved if we understand the way in which moral principles found in Rousseau¿s work relate to and interconnect with the principles of political right that he establishes (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/00436-1 - On the conditions of possibility of the ideal society: the possible dialogue between Rousseau's second discourse and social contract |
| Grantee: | Johnatas Ximenes Milani |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |