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| Author(s): |
Thiago do Nascimento Fonseca
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2021-07-23 |
| Examining board members: |
Rogério Bastos Arantes;
George Avelino Filho;
Paulo Furquim de Azevedo;
Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra Limongi
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| Advisor: | Rogério Bastos Arantes |
| Abstract | |
This dissertation contests the widespread recommendation according to which anti-corruption institutions must be granted independence guarantees in order to preserve their impartiality. According to the new argument proposed here, in democracies, anti-corruption agents protected by independence guarantees wish to hold and enlarge their institutional power. To achieve their goals, these agents give up their impartiality and avoid imposing political costs on majority governments in contexts of political stability. With data regarding the oversight over corruption carried out by the Brazilian Supreme Audit Court, the regression discontinuity design compares federal government\'s and federal opposition\'s allies at the municipal level, overwhelming the main research strategy applied by experts, who compare the political and technical appointment of the audit courts\' leadership. Even with broad independence guarantees and regardless of the previous technical or political career of audit court\'s heads, the results show that the federal government\'s allies are not under the audit court\'s oversight as much as the federal opposition\'s ones. Qualitative evidence and additional tests support the main assumptions of the new argument as well. The implication of these findings is twofold: on the one hand, the political bias from independent anti-corruption institutions affords competitive advantages to specific political actors and biases the democratic competition; on the other, voters, if disagree with it, have no means to react against agents protected by independence rules. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 17/00702-6 - Institutional independence and horizontal accountability: the (im)partial performance of public audit institutions in Brazil |
| Grantee: | Thiago do Nascimento Fonseca |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |