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| Author(s): |
Pedro Henrique Santos Decanini Marangoni
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | Assis. 2022-01-28. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual Paulista (Unesp). Faculdade de Ciências e Letras. Assis |
| Defense date: | 2021-12-14 |
| Advisor: | Danilo Saretta Verissimo |
| Abstract | |
The purpose of this work is to present and confront two distinct models of phenomenology of perception, represented by the thoughts of Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, weaving parallels and locating specific divergences in their ways of theorizing the perspectival structure of sensitive experience. In both authors, the investigation of perspectivism is motivated by the philosophical elaboration of the paradoxical character of perceptual openness. In the phenomenological discourse shared by both thinkers, perception launches us into a world of sensible objects, presented in direct experience as real objects, under the condition that this visage is constitutively unfinished and open. The concreteness of the real is not oposed to the perspectivism of experience; rather, they are inextricably linked. In Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical operationalization of this inextricability is made in the task of reconciling the inexhaustibility of the perceived, the essential perspectivism of spatial objects, whose horizontal and elusive dimension is precisely what defines them as real objects, with the inherence of the subject to a point of view, this perspectivism evidenced by our condition as finite beings. In this double meaning of perspectivism, the comparison of Gurwitsch's and Merleau-Ponty's theses allows us to place in relief the tension between the phenomenological element, the description of the essential structures of the manifestation of objects to consciousness, and the anthropological element, marked by the emphasis on the finitude, the embodiment, and the rootedness of the perceptual subject in his concrete situations. Our investigation seeks to trace and intersect the paths that lead the authors to elaborate the link between the theory of perceptual adumbration, originating from phenomenological analysis, and the reflection on the essential rootedness of experience in a point of view, which will require us to clarify the anticipatory, practical, and embodied character of perception. Taking into consideration that the theme of perspectivism constitutes the foundation of their phenomenological elaborations about perceptual organization, the comparison of their thoughts is made in the light of a double conceptual framework, central to these thinkers, concerning Husserl's thought and the descriptive elaborations of Gestalt Psychology. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 17/15348-3 - The participation of corporality in the perceptive processes: counterpoints between Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty. |
| Grantee: | Pedro Henrique Santos Decanini Marangoni |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |