Full text
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| Author(s): |
Débora Lemos Nascentes
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Instituto de Relações Internacionais (IRI) |
| Defense date: | 2024-04-11 |
| Examining board members: |
Yi Shin Tang;
Oto Murer Küll Montagner;
Camila Emi Tomimatsu
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| Advisor: | Yi Shin Tang |
| Abstract | |
This research examines how the United States deals with the rise of emerging trading powers. It proposes that this is done through a reactive trade policy based on unilateral measures when mutually satisfactory agreements are not reached. To understand this U.S. stance and to analyze the determinants that lead to an escalation to the point of triggering a trade war, we used the theoretical framework of Game Theory, using a sequential game with perfect and complete information. This game, applied to the analysis of two case studies, U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China, revealed, through these examples, strategic nuances and behavioral patterns about the dynamics of trade relations between the United States and its emerging trading partners. Our main conclusion is that the adoption of reactive unilateral measures by the United States follows a strategic analysis of the payoffs that these measures can convey relative to the actions of the country against which they are directed. Thus, even though these measures entail high costs that affect not only bilateral relations but also reverberate globally, they may be the optimal choice for Washington, depending on the context, leading to the need for adaptive strategies for emerging powers, such as Brazil, that seek to preserve their interests in a dynamic international scenario. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 22/05841-2 - US trade policies vis-à-vis the disputes with Japan and China (1980-2021) and their lessons for emerging powers |
| Grantee: | Débora Lemos Nascentes |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |