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| Author(s): |
Daniel Peluso Guilhermino
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2024-02-09 |
| Examining board members: |
Marcus Sacrini Ayres Ferraz;
Alex de Campos Moura;
Luiz Damon Santos Moutinho;
Daniel Arvage Nagase
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| Advisor: | Marcus Sacrini Ayres Ferraz |
| Abstract | |
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the phenomenological theory of knowledge in Husserls Logical Investigations. The aim is to explain how Husserl phenomenologically converts the traditional problem of knowledge, which is usually addressed as the enigma of the connection between the immanence of the mind and the transcendence of the world. Husserl reveals that this positioning of the question is metaphysically loaded. The task of phenomenology is to suspend the validity of the metaphysical presuppositions of the immanence of the mind and the transcendence of the world and move back to the structuring elements of intentional lived experiences. By doing so, the concepts of giving and transcendence can be clarified and the question of the theory of knowledge can be restated, now in a phenomenological register. The question is no longer about the enigma of access to transcendence, but about the way in which transcendence is given: in other words, it is no longer a question of asking whether the openness to the world is possible, but of explaining how this openness of the world is accomplished. To reach this goal, we use as a guiding thread the contemporary problem of the Myth of the Given, which provides a model for the problem of the theory of knowledge in its nonphenomenological version. In the course of the thesis, we are confronted with a series of historical and analytical investigations, such as Lotzes problem about the real meaning of logical categories, the origins of the problem of givenness in contemporary philosophy from Lewis to Sellars, McDowells conceptualism, and the structure of sensible and categorial givenness in Husserl. Finally, we put forward some interpretative theses about pretranscendental phenomenology, namely: its essential link between the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, the absence of representationalism in its theory of sensibility, and the absence of psychologism in its theory of understanding (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 19/01444-6 - Non-conceptual content in Husserl's logical investigations |
| Grantee: | Daniel Peluso Guilhermino |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |