Functionalist views in the philosophy of mind and the qualitative aspect of consciousness

Author(s)

João Felipe Santana Rasi

• Document type: Master's Dissertation
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2025-02-07

Examining board members

Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior; Daniel Borgoni Gonçalves; Raquel Albieri Krempel; Samuel de Castro Bellini Leite

• Advisor: Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior

Abstract

Functionalism was once a popular theory in both neuroscience and the philosophy of mind, particularly during the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. This popularity arises from the theory\'s compatibility with physicalism while attempting to preserve, as much as possible, some dualist intuitions about the mind. However, like most philosophical theories, functionalism has faced criticisms over time. Especially its difficulty in accounting for the qualitative aspect of consciousness. In this regard, the present dissertation aims to analyze in detail whether functionalism can withstand its various objections especially those regarding absent and inverted qualia. To achieve this goal, the dissertation will be structured in several parts. The first part will be dedicated to thoroughly describing the functionalist versions that have been and remain popular in the debate. The second part will seek to understand the concept of qualia in greater detail and how it influences the debate.. The third part will analyze some recurring objections related to absent and inverted qualia found in the literature. Finally, after all relevant analysis has been conducted, we will provide a positive or negative assessment of how the theory stands against the criticisms regarding absent and inverted qualia (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 23/03526-5 - Functionalism in philosophy of mind: history and philosophical analysis
• Grantee: João Felipe Santana Rasi
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master