Full text
| |
| Author(s): |
Juliana Ortegosa Aggio
Total Authors: 1
|
| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2006-11-14 |
| Examining board members: |
Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano;
Lucas Angioni;
Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos
|
| Advisor: | Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano |
| Abstract | |
The dissertation investigates the relation between knowledge and perception, perception and thought, to be and to perceive according to Protagoras, Plato and Aristotle with the objective to show what is perception according to the sofistic and to the platonic paradigm and, finally, what is the place of the aristotelian thesis of perception in relation to these two paradigms. As a result of the investigation, we conclude that, for Aristotle, and differently from Protagoras, the perception is not responsable for all judgments, neither is responsable to discriminate all cognitive objects. Furthermore, for Aristotle and differently from Plato, the extreme opposite is not true, i.e., that perception does not discriminate its own objects. Knowledge and perception, therefore, must not be absolutely identical or distinct, neither the being is absolutely being perceived, neither the being perceived is absolutely indeterminated. However, according to Aristotle the being is, somehow, perceived and determinated by the perceiving faculty, and, somehow, known by the intelect. In this way, the dissertation intends to clarify how perception knows the being according to Aristotle by treating a very controversial point: how perception discriminates its own objects without the thought\'s intervention, if this discrimination is strictly a physiological process or is also an activity of the soul, and if it is also an activity of the soul, in which way the body\'s physical alteration conjoined with a certain activity of the soul constitute perception. (AU) | |