The imagination in the Critique of pure reason

Author(s)

Claudio Sehnem

• Document type: Master's Dissertation
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2009-04-13

Examining board members

Marcio Suzuki; Pedro Paulo Garrido Pimenta; Paulo Roberto Licht dos Santos

• Advisor: Marcio Suzuki

Abstract

According to the first edition (1781) of the Transcendental Deduction, the faculty of imagination is the fundamental faculty which binds, on the one hand, the intuition, and on the other hand, the understanding.This union can only be possible, however, if the imagination has not only a sensible character - for it is a faculty that belongs to the sensibility - but also an intelectual character. To show, in this sense, that imagination is that fundamental faculty - both sensible and intelectual - makes possible a \"doctrine of imagination\", from which is founded a certain reading of Kant\'s Critique of Pure Reason. For this, is necessary an understanding of time ( in the Transcendental Aesthetic) and of how the categorial thought is constituted in relation to it through a \"doctrine of imagination\", that is, through an explanation of the existing relations between imagination and time and also between imagination and the categories of thought. (AU)