Capital structure and asymmetric information: effects of corporate governance

Author(s)

Marçal Serafim Candido

• Document type: Master's Dissertation
• Press: Ribeirão Preto.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto (PCARP/BC)
• Defense date: 2010-10-01

Examining board members

Mauricio Ribeiro do Valle; Fabiano Guasti Lima; Wilson Toshiro Nakamura

• Advisor: Mauricio Ribeiro do Valle

Abstract

Since the Modigliani and Millers works (1958, 1963), the studies about the capital structure got a impulse, without development in a single way. In contrast, new lines of research had developed, with theoretical forecasts commonly tested empirically. In this way, this work aim contribute in this field of study and give some advance on the understand in the choice of capital structure by the enterprises. Specially, this work adopt the asymmetric information line of research between who finance (creditors and shareholders) and that uses the capital. It is adopted the corporate governance (C.G.) as a mechanism the minimize the effects of this asymmetric information between who give and get the capital. By the application of a method of empiric verification in a sample constituted by enterprises with shares negotiated in the market, was found evidence that C.G. facilitates the access of other financing form than debt. Then, enterprises with better practices of C.G. would have less debt. But, the results are sensible to the statistic method used, then, it is necessary a deep in future research that could verify the theoretical previsions. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 09/02528-7 - THE INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY ON THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF BRAZILIAN LISTED COMPANIES.
• Grantee: Marçal Serafim Candido
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master