Natural narratives: the Spinozan conception of truth in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione

Author(s)

Moysés Floriano Machado Filho

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2007-10-15

Examining board members

Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos; Marilena de Souza Chaui; Marcos André Gleizer; Lia Levy; Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura

• Advisor: Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos

Abstract

The objective of this work is to investigate the Spinozan concept of truth, with emphasis on the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). In order to do so, we have analysed his theory of ideas, presented in this text, in close comparison with that presented in the rest of Spinoza\'s work. Despite this, we have given pride of place to the TIE over the rest, with the firm purpose of showing that this work is not merely a passing phase. In effect, the TIE has been considered, over the years, a Spinoza failure for its (apparent) lack of elaboration of the definition of the intellect. However, what we intend to do is to show that, even if not in an explicit way, the definition of the intellect is there and, therefore, that the editors\' and commentators\' traditional interpretation - despite its being amply endorsed - is wrong. In fact, it has become conventional to say that the TIE does not articulate easily with the core of Spinoza\'s system. It is our purpose, nonetheless, to show that not only does this articulation exist, but also that it can be thoroughly and consistently supported. (AU)