IS THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTENTIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM? SOME REMARKS ON GÓMEZ-TORRENTE´S “ROADS TO REFERENCE”

FILIPE MARTONE

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(Reference retrieved automatically from SciELO through information on FAPESP grant and its corresponding number as mentioned in the publication by the authors.)

IS THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING INTENTIONS A GENUINE PROBLEM? SOME REMARKS ON GÓMEZ-TORRENTE´S “ROADS TO REFERENCE”

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Author(s):	FILIPE MARTONE ^[1] Total Authors: 1
Affiliation:	^[1] University of Campinas. Department of Philosophy - Brasil Total Affiliations: 1
Document type:	Journal article
Source:	Manuscrito; v. 43, n. 4, p. 49-58, 2020-11-09.
Abstract
Abstract In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data. (AU)

FAPESP's process:	15/26344-3 - Minimalism, Externalism and the limits of Semantics
Grantee:	Filipe Martone de Faria
Support Opportunities:	Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate

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