| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Krempel, Raquel
[1]
Total Authors: 1
|
| Affiliation: | [1] Univ Fed Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, SP - Brazil
Total Affiliations: 1
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | AUFKLARUNG-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA; v. 8, n. SI, p. 71-86, JUL 2021. |
| Web of Science Citations: | 0 |
| Abstract | |
The goal of this paper is to present some advantages of the representational and computational theories of mind when compared to other views, especially behaviorism. The idea is that representational and computational theories allow us to conceive propositional attitudes (mental states such as beliefs and desires) in a way that preserves two essential features we take them to have in common sense psychological explanations: semantic evaluability and causal efficacy. Behaviorism reconceives mental states in a way that doesn't preserve these essential features. In so doing, it makes a mystery of the success of common sense psychology. I illustrate some of the difficulties that behaviorism faces by considering and criticizing Wittgenstein's approach to linguistic understanding. The upshot is that representational and computational theories of mind do a better job at vindicating common sense psychology, and so are to be preferred when compared to behaviorism. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 18/12683-9 - Concepts and words: the case of colors |
| Grantee: | Raquel Albieri Krempel |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |