| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Ferrari, Francesco Maria
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | SYNTHESE; v. 200, n. 5, p. 23-pg., 2022-09-22. |
| Abstract | |
Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called "substitutional". In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the Nominalist's reach. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 18/16465-6 - Towards a Metaphysics of Processes |
| Grantee: | Francesco Maria Ferrari |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |