The notion of likeness in Aristotle's theory of sense-perception
Aristotle's answer: the relation between language and reality in Metaphysics Book
Challenges of men between appearances: reflections about virtue in the Nicomachean...
| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Keeling, Evan
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE; v. N/A, p. 26-pg., 2023-03-31. |
| Abstract | |
It is now common to explain some of incidental perception's features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia. Phantasia, usually translated as 'imagination,' is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10-29a9, I argue against this and for perception first: phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia, and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 20/15938-8 - Color for Aristotle |
| Grantee: | Evan Robert Keeling |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships abroad - Research |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/11249-8 - Protagoras in Ancient Greek Philosophy |
| Grantee: | Evan Robert Keeling |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships abroad - Research |