| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Rodrigues, Felix Carvalho
;
Xavier, Eduardo C.
;
Schafer, Guido
Total Authors: 3
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | ELECTRONIC NOTES IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE; v. 342, p. 18-pg., 2019-04-28. |
| Abstract | |
In the fair cost facility location game, players control terminals and must open and connect each terminal to a facility, while paying connection costs and equally sharing the opening costs associated with the facilities it connects to. In most of the literature, it is assumed that each player control a single terminal. We explore a more general version of the game where each player may control multiple terminals. We prove that this game does not always possess pure Nash equilibria, and deciding whether an instance has equilibria is NP-Hard, even in metric instances. Furthermore, we present results regarding the efficiency of equilibria, showing that the price of stability of this game is equal to the price of anarchy, in both uncapacitated and capacitated settings. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 15/11937-9 - Investigation of hard problems from the algorithmic and structural stand points |
| Grantee: | Flávio Keidi Miyazawa |
| Support Opportunities: | Research Projects - Thematic Grants |
| FAPESP's process: | 16/23552-7 - Cutting and Packing Problems: Practical and Theoretical Approaches |
| Grantee: | Rafael Crivellari Saliba Schouery |
| Support Opportunities: | Regular Research Grants |