The universality of judgement of taste in Kant' s work

• Grant number: 05/04192-5
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Start date: April 01, 2006
• End date: March 31, 2008
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Maria Lucia Mello e Oliveira Cacciola
• Grantee: Ivanilde Aparecida Vieira Cardoso Fracalossi
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

As it doesn’t intend to know any object, the universality of judgement of taste doesn’t have an objective principle. However, to assure its necessity and to escape from contingency of experience, this universality supports itself on the exemplar principle of common sense (Gemeinsinn), that is, on the subjective principle that knows only through the feeling, and not through the concept of what is pleasure or not. Nevertless, the necessity in this judgement, under the presupposition of the universal agreement as regards what’s beautiful, it acquires one objective representation based on fundament of our feeling. This project intents to examine the raison of Kant’s concern in set up one universality of taste’s judgement in spite of being a subjective judgement, singular and not interested, even so it demands an universality. For that, we will use as basic tests the Critique of judgement and the Critique of pure raison, and also always our investigation needs, we’ll look for another references of Kant and authorized commentators toward this subject.

Academic Publications

(References retrieved automatically from State of São Paulo Research Institutions)

FRACALOSSI, Ivanilde Aparecida Vieira Cardoso. The universality of judgement of taste in Kant\' s work. 2008. Master's Dissertation - Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) São Paulo.