Sensation as alteration in Aristotle's De Anima

• Grant number: 11/17293-5
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: November 01, 2011
• End date: October 31, 2013
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Marco Antônio de Ávila Zingano
• Grantee: Fernanda de Araujo Izidório
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This research aims to explain and analyze the problems in the theory of sensation as alteration or material change presented in Aristotle's De Anima and how this theory would be applicable to the objects of sensation, determining the cognitive hole of this faculty. We will investigate two possible interpretations on De Anima II 5: that in the Myles Burnyeat 2002's article "De Anima II 5", which state that this alteration is a kind of change exclusive from cognitive capacity and deny that it is the same kind of change presented in Physics, definition which is applicable to alterations in general; and Richard Sorabji's one in the articles "Body and Soul in Aristotle"(1974) and "Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception" (1995), which state this alteration is a physiological and material explicable process. Thus, we will analyze the text of De Anima, emphasizing the precision and the extension of the concepts, not only in the Aristotelian treatise of soul, but also in other author's fundamental works, especially those that contributes to the study of change. (AU)