Is the dispute settlement body impartial? Observational and experimental evidences from the World Trade Organization

• Grant number: 14/09938-4
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research
• Start date: September 02, 2014
• End date: July 01, 2015
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Political Science - International Politics
• Principal Investigator: Gabriel Cepaluni
• Grantee: Gabriel Cepaluni
• Host Investigator: Rebecca B. Morton
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais (FCHS). Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Campus de Franca. Franca , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: New York University, United States

Abstract

This project examines whether the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) takes impartial decisions or not. We first analyze the decisions of the panelists from the Dispute Settlement Body and, then, from the members of the WTO Appellate Body. We test whether there are favoritism in regard the decisions involving States in trade disputes. At first instance, the parties select three judges on mutual agreement. The three judges draw up a report on the litigation. The decision goes to the Appellate Body in case a party in the dispute does not agree with the decision. In this second instance, judges are selected at random, which eliminates any bias that might favor either one or other party. We tested whether these steps actually produced a balanced outcome for the parties or not. At the second instance, our analysis is even more clear-cut because the random allocation of judges to cases should eliminate any extrajudicial bias. In summary, this study investigates to what extent the WTO Dispute Settlement Body decisions are unbiased. (AU)