On the intuitive Knowledge of non-existents in Willian of Ockham

• Grant number: 14/10335-2
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: August 01, 2014
• End date: July 31, 2016
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: José Carlos Estêvão
• Grantee: Júlia Rodrigues Molinari
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

The discussion on the hypothesis of the intuitive knowledge of non-existents having or not skeptical consequences inside William of Ockham's philosophy hasn't yet come to a conclusion and causes disagreements among the commentators. The hypothesis occurs in Ockham's "theory of knowledge" as a theoretical possibility of supernatural action, that is, for that type of knowledge to occur it would be necessary the divine intervention , that, however, cannot be dismissed in the field of possibilities, even hypothetical ones. It is discussed if the problem centers on the theological field, as it seems initially, or if it can be extended to the natural field - because it will have direct consequences concerning the theory of knowledge, namely, the rupture of the necessity of causality between the existence of the thing known, and the act of the intellect that knows that thing, the intuition. Such rupture will serve as base of skeptical theories more or less assumedly as subsequent to Ockham, so that is necessary analyzes if already in his philosophy that rupture incurs in necessarily skeptical consequences.