Virtue of character and practical wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics

• Grant number: 14/24280-5
• Support type: Scholarships in Brazil - Master
• Effective date (Start): March 01, 2015
• Effective date (End): June 30, 2017
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Cooperation agreement: Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES)
• Principal researcher: Lucas Angioni
• Grantee: Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira
• Home Institution: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (IFCH). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil
• Associated scholarship(s): 16/17842-2 - NE VI: some questions about phrónesis and virtue of character roles, BE.EP.MS

Abstract

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the following claims: "the end (telos) cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only what contributes to the ends (ta pros ta tele)" (1112b33-34) and "virtue (arete) makes the goal (skopon) right, practical wisdom makes (phronesis) the things toward the goal right" (1144a7-9). A problem arises from such claims: the ends assumed by a moral agent cannot be subject to rational choice. For deliberation, an intellectual process, is bound to the things that contribute to the ends; and the ends, in turn, fall within the realm of virtue of character, which is described by Aristotle as a virtue of the non-rational part of the soul. Prima facie, the thesis may seem counterintuitive because one tends to think that the ends pursued by a moral agent are chosen by some kind of intellectual process. In order to understand how Aristotle supports his thesis, this research investigates how virtue of character and practical wisdom are related; how they are articulated together to delimit both the ends and the things that contribute to the ends; and, finally, how the roles played by virtue of character and phronesis must be understood in the formulation of deliberate choice (prohairesis). (AU)