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| Author(s): |
Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Defense date: | 2017 |
| Advisor: | Lucas Angioni |
| Abstract | |
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the following claims: "the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only what contributes to the ends" (NE 1112b33-34) and "virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom makes the things toward the goal right" (NE 1144a7-9). A problem arises from such claims: the ends assumed by a moral agent seem to be not subject to rational choice. For deliberation, an intellectual procedure, is bound to deal with the things that contribute to the ends, and the ends, in turn, fall within the realm of virtue of character, which is described by Aristotle as a virtue of the non-rational part of the soul. In order to understand how Aristotle supports such claims, this research investigates how virtue of character and practical wisdom are related and the work of both virtues in the task of delimiting the ends and the things that contribute to the ends in the actions (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 14/24280-5 - Virtue of character and practical wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics |
| Grantee: | Angelo Antonio Pires de Oliveira |
| Support type: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |