| Grant number: | 17/05223-9 |
| Support type: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |
| Effective date (Start): | June 01, 2017 |
| Effective date (End): | August 31, 2018 |
| Field of knowledge: | Physical Sciences and Mathematics - Computer Science |
| Cooperation agreement: | Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) |
| Principal Investigator: | Flávio Keidi Miyazawa |
| Grantee: | Francisco Jhonatas Melo da Silva |
| Home Institution: | Instituto de Computação (IC). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil |
| Associated research grant: | 15/11937-9 - Investigation of hard problems from the algorithmic and structural stand points, AP.TEM |
Abstract Traffic congestion and CO2 emissions are major issues in today's society, and it is mostly related with transportation system. As a class of resource allocation games, transportation games models those situations, and through them we can analyze how the selfish behavior of agents can impact on the social optimal outcome. We will consider some possible extensions of these gamesand will study the existence and properties of pure Nash equilibrium on the cases admitting it. Furthermore, we aim to give bounds on two measures of inefficiency of equilibrium, price of anarchy and price of stability respectively, for those extensions. (AU) | |