Advanced search
Start date
Betweenand

Dispositional libertarianism: outline of a dispositional account of laws of nature and free will

Grant number: 17/20532-8
Support Opportunities:Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral
Start date: April 01, 2018
End date: May 31, 2021
Field of knowledge:Humanities - Philosophy - Metaphysics
Principal Investigator:Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino
Grantee:Pedro Merlussi
Host Institution: Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project deals with the problem of free will and determinism. The aim is to look at the conceptual relationship between dispositional accounts of laws of nature and the thesis that there is free will (and related concepts, such as moral responsibility and the ability to do otherwise in the same circumstances). Although the Humean account of laws has been recently criticised, compatibilism is still motivated by it. Here I propose an alternative to this scenario: dispositional libertarianism. This view is the combination of a dispositional account of laws together with the claim that agents are able to do otherwise from what they did. The results of this project should lead to a more plausible alternative to the prevailing Humean compatibilist view in contemporary analytic philosophy.

News published in Agência FAPESP Newsletter about the scholarship:
More itemsLess items
Articles published in other media outlets ( ):
More itemsLess items
VEICULO: TITULO (DATA)
VEICULO: TITULO (DATA)

Scientific publications
(References retrieved automatically from Web of Science and SciELO through information on FAPESP grants and their corresponding numbers as mentioned in the publications by the authors)
MERLUSSI, PEDRO. Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (beta). HILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION, v. 25, n. 2, p. 15-pg., . (17/20532-8)
LAMPERT, FABIO; MERLUSSI, PEDRO. Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, v. 178, n. 2, . (17/20532-8)
MERLUSSI, PEDRO. Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency. STUDIA LOGICA, v. 107, n. 3, p. 5-pg., . (17/20532-8)