Truth and post-truth in the light of contemporary pragmatism

• Grant number: 18/10739-7
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: September 01, 2018
• End date: August 31, 2020
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - Epistemology
• Principal Investigator: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez
• Grantee: Gabriel Engel Ducatti
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC). Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Campus de Marília. Marília , SP, Brazil

Abstract

This project aims to analyze the concept of truth with an emphasis on the pragmatist perspectives, especially of Charles S. Peirce, and Richard Rorty's neopragmatism, in order to consider possible implications of the contemporary utilization of the concept of post-truth. There is in pragmatism a definition of truth that is more tangible to the human being and his relations, less as an accurate and ultimate correspondence of the world, which apparently reflects modes of relation between truth and social action. Richard Rorty, disagreeing with some predecessors, like Peirce, proposed that truth should not be regarded as an objective of philosophical inquiry. Rorty (2005) advocates abandoning the "true" predicate because, having no descriptive sense to relate it to real properties, in using such a term there would be no way of establishing the truth of belief but referring to justification. Considering this perspective of abandoning the search for truth, in this project we aim to analyze and discuss not only the concept of truth in pragmatism and neopragmatism, but also to understand some consequences, at the level of conduct, of key concepts of the so-called post-truth Age. Post-truth, in short, is a philosophical conception according to which the study of the concept of truth, based on facts, considered objective, has less relevance and influence in public opinion than the appeal to individual/collective emotions and beliefs, which is expressed, for example, with the propagation of fake news. We argue that in the current scenario of consumption and transmission of information, supposed truths do not point to an "objective reality", but are mainly based on the emotions and beliefs of individuals, which, in a way, does not seem to distance itself from the rortyan perspective. We aim to investigate the possible consequences in individual and collective action of abandoning the search for truth proposed by Rorty's neopragmatism.