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Practical reason and the determination of the ends of action in Aristotle

Grant number: 19/05555-7
Support type:Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate
Effective date (Start): June 01, 2019
Effective date (End): February 28, 2022
Field of knowledge:Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
Principal researcher:Evan Robert Keeling
Grantee:Victor Gonçalves de Sousa
Home Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
Associated research grant:15/05317-8 - Theories of causation and human agency in ancient Greek philosophy, AP.TEM

Abstract

This work intends to offer a reconstruction of Aristotle's position on the role of reason in the determination of the ends of action that conciliates both the thesis according to which agents who are neither virtuous nor vicious can aim at morally good ends and the thesis according to which virtue makes the end right, explaining in this way how would it be possible to have a morally good end in view without it being a right end. In general, the reconstructions of Aristotle's position on this question either reform one of these two theses or else commit themselves to a reading of Aristotle's practical philosophy that either does not take a stance on the exact nature of the relation between reason and desire or else, when speaking about this relation, assumes a controversial position on hylomorphism.In order to avoid these difficulties, we will come up with another alternative, which seems not only to preserve the two theses that were mentioned, but also to explain clearly and without depending on the subscription to a strong version of hylomorphism in which way the morally good end that non virtuous agents may eventually aim at does not consist in the correct end, that is, is not the same end aimed by a phronimos. (AU)