Practical reason and the determination of the ends of action in Aristotle
Moral Actions in the Nicomachean Ethics: reason, emotion, and moral development
Aristotle on virtuous action and the role of virtue in making the ends right
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Practical reason and its role in determining the ends of action in Aristotle\'s practical philosophy
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| Author(s): |
Victor Gonçalves de Sousa
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2024-08-12 |
| Examining board members: |
Evan Robert Keeling;
David Owain Maurice Charles;
Paulo Fernando Tadeu Ferreira;
Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano
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| Advisor: | Evan Robert Keeling |
| Abstract | |
The aim of this Dissertation is to ascertain what role reason has in determining the ends of action in Aristotle\'s practical philosophy. I argue that Aristotle is committed to an answer to this question according to which full virtue (ἀρϵτὴ κυρία) enables one to aim for fine ends for their own sakes, decide on virtuous actions on their own account, and perform virtuous actions for their own sakes. Yet, on my reading, full virtue would not be necessary for aiming for fine ends (although being virtuous in some sense turns out to be necessary for that), which is sufficient for securing that agents who are not fully virtuous such as the continent and the incontinent are able to aim for ends that are right, provided they cannot aim for such ends for their own sakes (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 19/05555-7 - Practical reason and the determination of the ends of action in Aristotle |
| Grantee: | Victor Gonçalves de Sousa |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |