The dialogue between Voloshinov and Humboldt in the philosophy of language: patici...
The problem of being-for-the-other in Frantz Fanon: Understanding the zone of non-...
| Grant number: | 20/11116-3 |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctoral |
| Start date: | December 01, 2020 |
| End date: | March 31, 2022 |
| Field of knowledge: | Humanities - Philosophy |
| Principal Investigator: | Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino |
| Grantee: | Matheus Valente Leite |
| Host Institution: | Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência (CLE). Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Campinas , SP, Brazil |
Abstract The goal of this project is to construct an intersubjective theory of beliefs - i.e. applicable both to distinct individuals as well as to a single individual across time. Well-known problems plague any extant theory of this kind. This project sets out to tackle two of the most fundamental ones and to offer a unified solution to them. First, there's the long-standing problem of the essential indexical and cognitive dynamics, i.e. of providing a theory of self-beliefs (related to the first-person pronouns 'I', 'me', 'my' etc.) and temporal-beliefs (related to the temporal indexicals 'now', 'soon', 'today' etc.). What is it, for example, to share someone else's self-beliefs or to retain a temporal belief as time moves along? Second, there's the issue of topic continuity across revision. A growing body of literature about conceptual engineering suggest that a central part of philosophy can be conceived as the normative project of evaluating and, if necessary, revising our concepts. But how is it possible to revise, and thus modify, a concept (such as that of existence or freedom) while still achieving the primary goal of the revision (a deeper understanding of issues - "what is it to exist or to be free?" - that are formulated using these very concepts)? This is a second problem for a theory of belief: how can beliefs constituted by distinct concepts somehow have a continuous topic? The main hypothesis of this project is that a unified response to these two issues is possible: connected beliefs might be of the same type even if their meanings or the perspectives that constitute them are distinct. If this hypothesis is proven, it would allow a solution to both issues with an integrated strategy. If not, then it would at least determine that both issues have to be treated separately and given independent accounts. Any of these two conclusions would be an important contribution to current debates about belief and intersubjectivity. | |
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