Self-Consciousness in Elizabeth Anscombe: An Analysis of The First Person

• Grant number: 25/14423-8
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Scientific Initiation
• Start date: September 05, 2025
• End date: December 19, 2025
• Field of knowledge: Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
• Principal Investigator: Anderson Luis Nakano
• Grantee: Carolina Bodanzky Bolognesi
• Supervisor: Jean-Philippe Narboux
• Host Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Comunicação, Letras e Artes. Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
• Institution abroad: Université de Strasbourg, France
• Associated to the scholarship: 24/19178-9 - Self-Consciousness in Elizabeth Anscombe: an analysis of The First Person, BP.IC

Abstract

In the article The First Person (1975), G. E. M. Anscombe examines the connection between the use of the pronoun "I" and the notion of self-consciousness, questioning the view that "I" functions as a referring expression equivalent to a proper name. Her analysis culminates in the formulation of the conditional: "if 'I' is a referring expression, then Descartes was right about what the reference is [namely, the res cogitans]". This conditional is supported by Anscombe's identification of three degrees of guaranteed reference that must be fulfilled for an expression to count as referential: (1) the existence of a referent; (2) the match between the kind of object the speaker intends to refer to and the kind actually referred to; and (3) the impossibility of error in the identification of the referent. The present research focuses on the second degree of guaranteed reference - the requirement that a proper name be semantically tied to a conception of its object - examining how this requirement underpins Anscombe's argument and leads to a critique of the idea of self-consciousness as consciousness of a self. In this context, the research analyzes Saul Kripke's objections to Anscombe's position, particularly his refusal to accept the Cartesian implication embedded in the conditional. The aim is to clarify to what extent the semantic requirement challenged by Kripke constitutes, for Anscombe, a structural point in the distinction between reference and self-consciousness. (AU)