The philosophy of Adam Smith: imagination and speculation

Author(s)

Leonardo André Paes Müller

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2016-02-02

Examining board members

Maria das Graças de Souza; Laurent Jaffro; Catherine Larrère; Maria Isabel de Magalhães Papaterra Limongi; Nicholas Tindal Phillipson; Pedro Paulo Garrido Pimenta

• Advisor: Pedro Paulo Garrido Pimenta

Abstract

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith establishes a pluralist scheme to explain moral approbation, with four kinds of moral judgments: 1) regarding the motives of the agent, the judgment determines its propriety or impropriety; 2) regarding the immediate effects of the action, the judgement determines its merit or demerit; 3) analyzing if this act is a particular case of a general rule, the judgement determines if the agent has acted according to his duty; and 4) regarding the remote effects of the action, that is, the way this action is a part of the global operations of society (a judgement that Smith calls the appearance of utility). These four kinds of moral judgments are grounded in imagination and form the totality of the principle of approbation that structure the speculative part of his moral philosophy. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 11/20973-8 - The philosophy of Adam Smith
• Grantee: Leonardo André Paes Müller
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate