Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological problem: inherence and transcendence

Author(s)

José Luiz Bastos Neves

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2016-06-03

Examining board members

Marilena de Souza Chaui; Maria Adriana Camargo Cappello; Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura; Luiz Damon Santos Moutinho; Silvana de Souza Ramos

• Advisor: Marilena de Souza Chaui

Abstract

This work aims at elucidating the problems underlying Merleau-Pontys transition from a phenomenology of perception to an ontology of sensible being. By means of an analysis of his first books, we try to apprehend the sense of the philosophical task he will pursue throughout his career, namely to reconcile the inherence of subjectivity in the world and its intentional ability to make it appear in its transcendence. We show that Merleau-Pontys critique of Husserls transcendental idealism leads him to interpret intentional correlation not as one established between consciousness and object, but as one established between lived body and perceived world. This correlation no longer sustains exclusively the thesis of the objects dependence on transcendental subjectivity, but also implicates a dimension of subjectivitys belonging to the sensible world and hence to some form of objectivity. We then analyze the conceptual tools, widely taken from Husserl\'s phenomenology of passivity, that come into play to account for this project: the world as horizon structure, the sensations as bearing an original form of intentionality, temporality as the instance in which beings phenomenalisation and subjectivitys rooting in it should be reconciled. However, we try to demonstrate that Merleau-Pontys project is not fully achieved in his first works. This is mainly due to the phenomenological principle according to which there must be some sort of difference between consciousness and appearance in order for the thing that appears to maintain its intentional transcendence in relation to phenomena. In his first books, Merleau-Ponty is incapable of accounting for this difference between consciousness and appearance as being also some sort of identity between them. This renders the notions of lived boy and incarnation conceptually instable, and ultimately implies an antinomy between inherence and transcendence. In that sense, we show that the doctrine of temporality only lessens the difficulty without actually solving it. In conclusion, we sketch how the concept of reversibility in Meleau-Pontys later works only becomes fully understandable as a response to the difficulties revealed in his earlier books. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 11/22150-9 - Intersubjectivity and sociability in Merleau-Ponty
• Grantee: José Luiz Bastos Neves
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate