Ministerial policy: individual budget amendments in the brazilian coalition presidentialism

Author(s)

Joyce Hellen Luz

• Document type: Master's Dissertation
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2017-09-01

Examining board members

Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra Limongi; Lúcio Remuzat Rennó Júnior; Bruno Pinheiro Wanderley Reis

• Advisor: Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra Limongi

Abstract

The literature on the decision-making process in the Brazilian Congress asserts that partisanship is the main factor organizing the legislative arena. Brazilian legislators are rarely able to act individually (i.e. without the support and authorization of their party leaders). However, in spite of this agreement on the importance of the parties, part of the literature also states that members of congress have the ability to operate without suffering the constraints of political parties in amending the budget bill introduced by the Executive at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Individual interests should show up exactly at this crucial moment of the legislative process. Moreover, the budget-making process should configure an excellent opportunity for the Executive to negotiate with legislators in order to obtain support for its own policy agenda. By this argument parties are absent and legislators, as individuals, would come to the center of the stage. My work, however, goes against this perspective and seeks to show the reasons why even when one should expect individual behavior, political parties show their strength and importance. My overall goal is to demonstrate that, against the expectations, partisanship matters for the budget-making process in Brazil. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 14/24759-9 - Parties and ministerial policy: the individual amendments in the Brazilian coalition presidentialism
• Grantee: Joyce Hellen Luz
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master