Essentialism, modality and The Direct Reference Theory /

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Author(s):	Thainá Coltro Demartini Total Authors: 1
Document type:	Master's Dissertation
Press:	Campinas, SP.
Institution:	Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Defense date:	2020-03-27
Examining board members:	Marco Ruffino; Lucas Angioni; Emiliano Boccardi
Advisor:	Marco Ruffino
Abstract
It is doubtful whether Kripke¿s semantical theory alone - or any other version of direct reference theory alone - entails strong essentialist claims. In this work, I analyze such claims through (i) following Kripke¿s argumentation closely, and (ii) using Salmon¿s interpretation of how we could build Kripke¿s perspective without excluding the a priori role from the scheme, (iii) being particularly attentive to essentialist claims that involve general terms such as natural kind terms, and finally (iv) opposing Fine¿s proposal to Salmon¿s in order to understand the limitations of a modal approach to essence. My goal is to contribute to the debate around the boundaries between semantics and metaphysics in the direct reference theory and how to understand scientific discoveries within this context (AU)

FAPESP's process:	16/25913-7 - Essentialism, modality and the direct reference theory
Grantee:	Thainá Coltro Demartini
Support Opportunities:	Scholarships in Brazil - Master