The refusal of the experience of madness as reason to doubt in the cartesian project of critical of the knowledge

Author(s)

Regis Cardoso

• Document type: Master's Dissertation
• Press: Campinas, SP.
• Institution: Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
• Defense date: 2009-09-23

Examining board members

Enéias Forlin; Erico Andrade Marques de Oliveira; Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora

• Advisor: Enéias Forlin

Abstract

This work has for objectives: A) try understand the reasons of the Cartesian refusal of the experience of madness in the plan of its critical one to the knowledge in the First Meditation. B) verify if not inserted in a cartesian perspective, the adhesion to madness as skeptical experience, could be supported. C) to critically analyze the interpretations that Foucault and Derrida realize on the cartesian refusal of madness on the one hand, and the admission of the experience of the dreams another one. How much to the first objective, it was verified that the adhesion to the experience of madness would stop the cartesian philosophical persistence. How much to the second objective, from the analysis of one recent intitled article "the argument of madness", was verified that madness can yes be supported as skeptical artifice. Finally, we conclude that, as much in Foucault, how much in Derrida exist interpretative mistake, in regards to its analysis on the refusal of madness for Descartes. (AU)