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| Author(s): |
Eduardo Alves Lazzari
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2021-07-01 |
| Examining board members: |
Marta Teresa da Silva Arretche;
Maria Candelaria Garay;
Sergio Wulff Gobetti;
Marcelo Medeiros Coelho de Souza
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| Advisor: | Marta Teresa da Silva Arretche |
| Abstract | |
Although competitive and unequal democracies in Latin America have recently introduced different redistributive policies, mitigating inequality, these regimes have done it exclusively through expenditures, which was not predicted by the literature. Having maintained the regressiveness of its tax systems, there is a contradiction that requires an explanation on why these democracies have not used taxation for redistributive ends. This contradiction is theoretically relevant, since it demonstrates that the most influential theories on the relation between democracies and inequality - the median voter theorem, partisan government, and the competition for outsiders - are not able to reconcile the divergent redistributive outcomes between taxation and expenditures in Latin America, region that concentrates most of the unequal and competitive democracies. Hence, it is proposed a theoretical model that highlights the problems, the attributes, and the politics specific to taxation. These three factors marginalize the redistributive role of taxation, turn the electoral incen- tives ine ective for progressive tax changes - unlike what happens with expenditures - and trigger intense political disputes, which will be determined by the formation of coalitions. In this context, progressive tax changes, being major overhauls or incremental changes alike, occur only in specific political contexts. The empirical demonstration of this analytical argument is made through the Brazilian case. It is analyzed: i) a critical juncture which forged the current and regressive Brazilian tax system, ii) all legislative proposals regarding tax policy between 1988 and 2020; iii) CPMF as a tool to increase revenue collection; and iv) a small and failed attempt of progressive tax reform, PEC 41/2003. In all those cases, it will be evident that the main problem regarding taxation is collection - not redistribution -, the electoral incentives for progressive tax changes are not present, and anti- progressivenes coalitions - formed by center and right-wing parties - systematically veto progressive chances, in the Brazilian case, which is distinctively marked by the fragility of pro-progresiveness coalitions. Therefore, it is the political dispute, distant from electoral competition, due to tax policy specificities, and the hostile political conditions for pro-progressiveness coalitions that contribute to the regressiveness of tax systems in those democracies. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 17/24614-9 - Brazilian fiscal structure: redistributive expenditures and regressive revenues |
| Grantee: | Eduardo Alves Lazzari |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |