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| Author(s): |
Fabricio Vasselai
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2015-08-10 |
| Examining board members: |
Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra Limongi;
Ciro Biderman;
Ernesto Federico Calvo;
Glauco Peres da Silva;
Cesar Zucco Junior
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| Advisor: | Fernando de Magalhaes Papaterra Limongi |
| Abstract | |
This research oers 3 independent studies on the questions of what is party nationalization, how nationalization, regionalization or localism are aected by and aect the electoral systems and the party systems. More specically, in the 1st chapter a new theoretical denition of party and party system nationalization is presented, dividing such concept into four dimensions - the nationalization of party organization, of the electoral supply, of the electoral demand and of the electoral outcome. After that, such a theoretical framework is applied to the Brazilian case to demonstrate how, in fact, more conceptual precision can alter empirical readings about a given party system. The 2nd chapter explores one of the consequences of party system nationalization, which literature has theorized but never tested directly. Namely, the idea that party nationalization would be what puts the electoral circumscriptions together and what makes Duvergerian propositions move from the local to the national level. To test that, party system nationalization is included for the rst time in a model of eective number of parties, after handling endogeneity problems that have prevented scholars from doing the same. With such inclusion, it will be proven and demonstrated that omitting party nationalization from models of number of parties, which is a common practice, incurs in omitted variable bias. In fact, such correct inclusion of party nationalization trough a system of simultaneous equations corrects that bias, altering some of the canonical interpretations about party system fragmentation. Lastly, in the 3rd chapter I reevaluate the common idea that electoral systems with personal voting would lead to geographical concentration (i.e. localization) of candidates\' electoral support. I oer a theoretical discussion and then empirical evidence that such territorial pattern is not the rule of what happens for instance in open-list PR. Besides, both concentrating and spreading votes are electorally protable results and very few candidates achieve levels of concentration that predicts eective increases in the odds of being elected. (AU) | |