What is in our power, determinism and moral responsibility in Aristotle

Author(s)

Dionatan Acosta Tissot

• Document type: Doctoral Thesis
• Press: São Paulo.
• Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
• Defense date: 2020-04-22

Examining board members

Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano; Ricardo Salles Afonso de Almeida; Paulo Fernando Tadeu Ferreira; João Francisco Nascimento Hobuss

• Advisor: Marco Antonio de Avila Zingano

Abstract

This work investigates if Aristotle admits that human beings are determined to act in a way, without any possibility to act differently. The work is divided in three parts. First, we argue for the thesis that the Aristotelian criteria for moral responsibility (i.e., the criteria for voluntariness of actions) establish human beings as primary efficient causes of their actions. We conclude from that that Aristotle does not accept a causal predeterminism concerning human action; The second part argues for the theses that the action is not determined until the moment in which the agent decides to act, for that what determines the action is either the desire or the deliberate choice, whose principle is in the agent; Finally, we present arguments for the thesis that, in certain cases, the psychological constitution of the agent, that from which the action results, does not allow that this agent acts differently. Though, these agents are a minority among the moral agents. (AU)

• FAPESP's process: 15/22490-5 - 'Eph' hêmin', determinism and moral responsibility in Aristotle
• Grantee: Dionatan Acosta Tissot
• Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate