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| Author(s): |
Leonardo Gomes de Soutello Videira
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | Campinas, SP. |
| Institution: | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas |
| Defense date: | 2016-11-18 |
| Examining board members: |
Marco Ruffino;
Dirk Greimann;
Joshua Rowan Thorpe
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| Advisor: | Marco Ruffino |
| Abstract | |
Analytic sentences were considered sentences that should be held true no matter what. However, the works of Quine casted doubts upon this idea. He showed that something about our understanding of analyticity was wrong. The definition of the notion did not match the cases we considered analytic sentences. Making the notion incoherent and, according to him, unintelligible. His suggestion was that we should interpret language differently as a whole in a way that the problems with analyticity were avoided. To back this view up he developed a very complex holistic view of language in behavioristic terms. During his journey to develop this language view he changed his mind about analyticity at some point. The objective of this dissertation is to compilate the different views of Quine concerning analyticity throughout his carrer. I also will make explicit the points where these views are wrong and the consider its consequences. For that, I exposed Quine¿s most relevant arguments from his three different phases and the criticisms of other philosophers concerning this phases (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 14/06919-9 - A study on analyticity in the philosophy of Quine |
| Grantee: | Leonardo Gomes de Soutello Videira |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Master |