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| Author(s): |
Manoel Galdino Pereira Neto
Total Authors: 1
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| Document type: | Master's Dissertation |
| Press: | São Paulo. |
| Institution: | Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD) |
| Defense date: | 2007-06-27 |
| Examining board members: |
Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes de Oliveira;
Fabiano Guilherme Mendes Santos;
Matthew Mac Leod Taylor
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| Advisor: | Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes de Oliveira |
| Abstract | |
This dissertation aimed to explain why Brazilian leaded coalition was capable of achieve a \"victory\" in WTO negotiation on TRIPs and Public Health, which culminated in the Doha Declaration. Following game theory applied to legislative studies, we tried to show the attainableness of suiting that literature to WTO negotiation, specially the feature of agenda setting. Basically, our main thesis is that what dictate negotiation results in this case is the institutional setting, since it determine power distribution among actors. Thus, we expect have shown the possibility of explain the final result in the TRIPs and Public Health negotiation by consensus rule, neutrality of agenda setting and the distribution of states impatience. The analysis has suggested a rich research agenda in the study of any noncooperative game in international institutions as well in the formulation of an institutionalist power concept in international relations. (AU) | |