Advanced search
Start date
Betweenand


Rules and rationality in Hume

Full text
Author(s):
Andrea Cachel
Total Authors: 1
Document type: Doctoral Thesis
Press: São Paulo.
Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH/SBD)
Defense date:
Examining board members:
Joao Paulo Gomes Monteiro; Sara Albieri; Eduardo Salles de Oliveira Barra; Roberto Bolzani Filho; Lívia Mara Guimarães
Advisor: Joao Paulo Gomes Monteiro
Abstract

In \"A Treatise of Human Nature\", Hume claims that there are two manners through which custom influences the production of inferences, namely, according to regular and irregular principles of imagination. Consequently, he stipulates certain general rules in order to point out the influence of custom on the first manner, circumscribing the realm of cause and effect to it. This thesis investigates these rules as well as their consequences regarding the establishment of the boundaries between reason and imagination. Considering that, according to Hume, there is not any racional justification to the cause-effect relationship, first we must question which is the parameter that allow us to separare, in reasoning, regular and irregular operation of the imagination. On the other hand, we intent to point in what extend a new notion of experimental rationality is constituted from the intervention of this new criteria. We also intent to discuss how the estabilization of understanding act works over imagination, which is placed in the range of normativity established by regulation, through the general rules of judgment. (AU)