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The GSP auction and price of anarchy

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Author(s):
Vinicius de Novaes Guimarães Pereira
Total Authors: 1
Document type: Master's Dissertation
Press: Campinas, SP.
Institution: Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP). Instituto de Computação
Defense date:
Examining board members:
Flávio Keidi Miyazawa; André Luís Vignatti; Orlando Lee
Advisor: Flávio Keidi Miyazawa
Abstract

Sponsored search auction is one of the most profitable sources of revenue on the internet. The growth of this market was, on average, 20% per year over the past years. Since the target audience and advertiser variety are big and diverse, a small increase in efficiency in this mechanism can bring a huge increase in the sites profits. In this work we discuss the evolution of the mechanisms used in this market, identifying the reasons of these changes. We evaluate the currently used mechanism, modeling in different ways and calculating the price of anarchy (AU)

FAPESP's process: 10/14666-2 - Mechanism design for internet ad-auctions
Grantee:Vinicius de Novaes Guimarães Pereira
Support Opportunities: Scholarships in Brazil - Master