| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Total Authors: 2
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| Affiliation: | [1] Sao Paulo Sch Econ FGV, Sao Paulo - Brazil
Total Affiliations: 1
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY; v. 163, p. 819-825, MAY 2016. |
| Web of Science Citations: | 2 |
| Abstract | |
We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 14/06069-5 - Equilibrium selection in dynamic environments with heterogeneity |
| Grantee: | Ana Elisa Gonçalves Pereira |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Doctorate |
| FAPESP's process: | 13/24368-7 - iPhone or Android? Equilibrium selection in dynamic models with network externalities |
| Grantee: | Ana Elisa Gonçalves Pereira |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships in Brazil - Doctorate |