| Full text | |
| Author(s): |
Ferrari, Francesco Maria
;
Bickhard, Mark H. H.
Total Authors: 2
|
| Document type: | Journal article |
| Source: | METAPHYSICA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR ONTOLOGY & METAPHYSICS; v. 24, n. 2, p. 26-pg., 2023-08-17. |
| Abstract | |
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we are interested in assessing the validity of one version of Kim's argument against genuine higher level causation. Second, we discuss Wilson's proposal to consider a weaker notion of emergence as genuinely metaphysical and compatible with Non-Reductive Physicalism. Our conclusion is that both proposals fail: the first in preempting genuine (strong) emergent causation, whereas the second in ensuring a genuinely metaphysical status to weak emergence. After all, Wilson's proposal strongly depends on the success of Kim's, not only because it takes it as valid but, also, because in pursuing its own weaker model it shares the presuppositions that led Kim's to failure. At the end of the day, Wilson's conception of genuine weak emergence either breaks causal closure or is merely stipulative, namely confined at the descriptive level. (AU) | |
| FAPESP's process: | 20/07440-0 - Duality and emergence of process-based entities |
| Grantee: | Francesco Maria Ferrari |
| Support Opportunities: | Scholarships abroad - Research Internship - Post-doctor |